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NON-REFOULEMENT RuN AFouL: THE QUESTIONABLE
LEGALITY OF EXTRATERRITORIAL REPATRIATION PROGRAMS
The last decade saw a veritable explosion in the number of people flee-
ing their homes in search of asylum in foreign countries.' In 1991 there
were nearly 17 million asylum-seekers worldwide.2 Numerous problems
have caused this massive increase in the number of asylum-seekers, in-
cluding political persecution, civil unrest, natural disasters and economic
despair.3 The world's response to the massive influx of potential asylum-
seekers has varied, has often been contrary to the letter and spirit of in-
ternational obligations,4 and in many cases has been inhumane.
The single most important foundation of refugee law is the principle of
non-refoulement.5 This principle generally prohibits nations from re-
1. The number of refugees world-wide grew from 7.8 million in 1983 to nearly 17 million in
1991. U.S. COMMrIrEE FOR REFUGEES, 1983 WORLD REFUGEE SURVEY 61 (Rosemary E. Tripp
ed., 1983) (7.8 million refugees); Report of the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees, U.N.
GAOR, 47th Sess., Supp. No. 12, at 1, U.N. Doc. A/47/12 (1992) [hereinafter "1992 Report of the
UNHCR"] (17 million refugees); see also U.S. COMMrITEE FOR REFUGEES, 1992 WORLD REFUGEE
SURVEY 61 (Virginia Hamilton ed., 1992) [hereinafter "1992 World Refugee Survey"] (listing a total
of 16.6 million in 1991).
2. 1992 Report of the UNHCR, supra note 1, at 1.
3. The U.N. High Commissioner for Refugees sees several sources of population movements
in Africa which could aptly refer to such flows worldwide.
[S]ome of the problems which triggered movements arose from the legacies of colonialism.
The majority, however, were a result of internal conflict, ethnic strife, abuse of human
rights, lack of political accountability and democracy, extreme poverty, structural adjust-
ment, heavy debt-servicing, the existence of weak systems and institutions for managing
the economy and policies, environmental degradation, drought and famine....
1992 Report of the UNHCR, supra note 1, at 19.
4. International obligations in this field arise largely from treaty obligations, and, as will be
discussed later, to some extent customary international law. The main expression of international
obligations comes from the U.N. Convention Relating to the Status of Refugees, July 28, 1951, 189
U.N.T.S. 137 [hereinafter "U.N. Convention"], and the U.N. Protocol Relating to the Status of
Refugees, Jan. 31, 1967, 19 U.S.T. 6223, 606 U.N.T.S. 267 [hereinafter "U.N. Protocol"]. Many
regional agreements spell out obligations of contracting states, notably the Organization for African
Unity Convention Governing the Specific Aspects of Refugee Problems in Africa, Sept. 10, 1969,
1001 U.N.T.S. 45 [hereinafter "O.A.U. Convention"], and the Recommendation on The Protection of
Persons Satisfying the Criteria in the Geneva Convention who are not Formally Recognized as Refu-
gees, Council of Eur. Comm. of Ministers, Doc. No. R(84)1, (1984). Finally, most bilateral extradi-
tion treaties address this issue as well, providing exceptions to extradition obligations in the case of
individuals accused of political crimes. See, eg., Convention for the Reciprocal Extradition of
Criminals, May 7, 1888, U.S. - Colombia, art. V, 26 Stat. 1534.
5. "The most fundamental of protection principles and the first of refugee rights is that of non-
refoulement...." 1988 Report of the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees, U.N. GAOR,
43rd Sess., Supp. No. 12, at 6, U.N. Doc. A/43/12 (1988) [hereinafter "1988 Report of the
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turning an individual to any country in which that person would be sub-
jected to persecution.6 The precise limits of this protection afforded to
asylum-seekers are unclear.7  Perhaps, the most controversial non-
refoulement issue is whether an individual fits within the definition of a
refugee, and thus, is deserving of protection. Much of the non-refoule-
mrent debate focuses on the so-called "screening" obligations-that is,
when a state must expend the resources to determine whether or not an
asylum-seeker is entitled to refugee protections, including the right of
non-refoulement8 No clear standard has emerged to determine when the
obligation arises to screen asylum-seekers.
The principle of non-refoulement first gained international recognition
in the period immediately following World War II, and it has grown in
acceptance ever since. The United Nations Convention Relating to the
Status of Refugees (U.N. Convention)9 is the primary expression of inter-
national refugee law drafted in the post-war period." The U. N. Con-
UNHCR"]; "T]he principle of non-refoulement [is] the foundation stone of international protec-
tion .. " GuY S. GOODWIN-GILL, THE REFUGEE IN INTERNATIONAL LAW 18 (1983); "This
principle ... can be regarded as the cornerstone of refugee law." Paul Weis, The Development of
Refugee Law, in TRANSNATIONAL LEGAL PROBLEMS OF REFUGEES 3, 31 (Michigan Yearbook of
International Legal Studies ed., 1982).
6. U.N. Convention, supra note 4, art. 33(1) at 176. See also GOODWIN-GILL, supra note 5,
at 69. Goodwin-Gill defines the obligation as follows:
No person in distress shall be returned to any country or rejected at any frontier if the
effect of such measure would be to expose him or her to a threat to life or liberty for
reasons of race, religion, national or ethnic origin, social group or political opinion, or
would be otherwise inhumane.
Guy S. Goodwin-Gill, Non-refoulement and the New Asylum Seekers, 26 VA. J. INT'L L. 897, 917
(1986).
7. Nations disagree whether they must extend this protection to all asylum-seekers, or only to
a subset consisting of those fleeing bonafide political persecution. The vast majority of states extend
refugee protections only to those asylum-seekers meeting certain political criteria. There is a consid-
erable debate whether the non-refoulement obligation extends, or should extend, to so-called "hu-
manitarian refugees"-that is, individuals fleeing lack of economic opportunity rather than political
persecution. This issue is beyond the scope of this Note. For an excellent discussion of this issue,
see Kay Hailbronner, Non-Refoulement and "Humanitarian" Refugees: Customary International
Law or Wishful Legal Thinking?, 26 VA. J. INT'L L. 857 (1986).
8. See 1992 Report of the UNHCR, supra note 1, 1 11, at 4. Though there is considerable
debate over who precisely should be entitled to the benefits of classification as a refugee, see supra
note 7, there is general agreement that those not fitting the definition are not entitled to the right
against refoulement. See 1992 Report of the UNHCR, supra note 1, at 5.
9. U.N. Convention, supra note 4. The U.N. Convention has been amended by the U.N.
Protocol, supra note 4. The two must be read together to understand fully the scope of international
obligations toward asylum-seekers.
10. The U.N. Convention and the U.N. Protocol are the "principal international instruments
benefiting refugees- .. " GOODWIN-GILL, supra note 5, at 13.
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vention delineates the responsibilities of signatory states toward
individuals seeking asylum.
Article 33 of the U.N. Convention prohibits a signatory state from
returning an alien who qualifies as a refugee11 to a place where that per-
son has a well-founded fear of persecution. At the time the U.N. Con-
vention was drafted, the principle of non-refoulement was quite new in
itself, and there was uncertainty about the precise territorial reach of the
obligation. The drafters left the language of the Convention vague on
this point, perhaps deliberately, in order to reach some agreement on the
treatment of refugees. In the years since the drafting of the Convention,
non-refoulement has gained limited acceptance as part of customary in-
ternational law, and applies to states whether or not signatory to the
Convention. 12
Nations have avoided a precise definition of the non-refoulement obli-
gation to circumvent the strict protective requirements of Article 33.13
Some states insist that legal presence within their own territory triggers
the obligation of non-refoulement.14 Other states require a refugee to be
11. The word "refugee" is a term of art in the immigration field. Unfortunately, it is also a
word on which it is difficult to pin a precise meaning because the definition has changed over time
and because different documents define "refugee" in different ways. The Statute of the United Na-
tions High Commissioner for Refugees defines a refugee as any person who "owing to well-founded
fear of being persecuted for reasons of race, religion, nationality or political opinion, is outside the
country of his nationality and is unable or, owing to such fear or for reasons other than personal
convenience, is unwilling to avail himself of the protection of that country." Statute of the Office of
the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees, G.A. Res. 428, Annex, U.N. GAOR, 5th Sess.,
325th Plen. Meeting, Supp. No. 20, at 46, U.N. Doc. A/1775 (1950). The U.N. Convention adds to
the list of reasons for the well-founded fear of being persecuted "membership of a particular social
group." U.N. Convention, supra note 4, art. l(A)(2), at 152. The O.A.U. Convention goes one step
further, adding to those who fit the U.N. Convention definition of "refugee" "every person who,
owing to external aggression, occupation, foreign domination or events seriously disturbing public
order in either part of [or] the whole of his country of origin or nationality, is compelled to leave his
place of habitual residence in order to seek refuge in another place outside his country of origin or
nationality." O.A.U. Convention, supra note 4, art. 1(2), at 47. This Note uses the terms "refugee"
and "asylum-seeker" interchangeably, unless otherwise indicated by the context.
12. See infra text accompanying notes 65-70.
13. Recently, many asylum-seekers have been returned to the hands of their persecutors. While
some nations have attempted to minimize their non-refoulement obligations, others have broadened
theirs. African countries have held themselves to a higher standard, not allowing repatriation in
situations involving civil strife or natural disaster. See supra note 11 and infra notes 57-61 and
accompanying text. European countries have also held themselves to a higher standard, not al-
lowing return of so-called de facto refugees or "B-status" refugees who do not quite fit the definition
of "refugee" under the U.N. Convention, but who still are granted limited asylum. See infra notes
62-64 and accompanying text.
14. See infra part II.A.
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physically present in the state in order for the principle to apply. '5 The
remaining states insist that the principle applies to refugees once they
have left their homeland, regardless of whether they have entered a new
territory.16
Part I of this Note examines the legal development of the non-refoule-
ment concept. Part II explores various international interpretations of
the concept of non-refoulement in practice. Part III examines the recent
judicial interpretations of state obligations by courts in the United States.
Part IV then proposes a universal definition of the territorial reach of the
non-refoulement obligation to provide protection against refoulement to
asylum-seekers regardless of where they are found.17
I. LEGAL DEVELOPMENT OF THE NON-REFOULEMENT CONCEPT
The non-refoulement obligation has evolved considerably in the near
half century following World War II. Early uses of the concept focused
only on the obligation not to return refugees to the hands of persecutors.
Scant attention was paid to the issue of where the refugees were found.I
Codification of the non-refoulement principle in the 1951 U.N. Conven-
tion resulted in a debate about its applicability to refugees at the frontiers
of contracting states. Though the language in the U.N. Convention is
15. See infra part II.B.
16. See infra part II.C.
17. This Note is not intended to be critical of the extraordinary efforts directed at making the
life of a refugee more bearable. The international community has made considerable progress since
the end of World War II. This Note focuses on what legal obligations exist today regarding the
treatment of refugees, and the failure of many states to live up to those legal standards. Despite the
failure of many states to live up to these obligations, the international community as a whole should
be praised for its work on behalf of refugees.
[Refugees] receive help on a scale which often surprises those who have little contact with
international institutions or with voluntary agencies that provide compassionate aid for the
victims of actions perpetrated by governments, their servants and associated groups. The
effort to assist refugees to stay alive through their initial peril, to return to their homes if
circumstances permit, to resettle in new lands if only that way is open and to avoid a
squandering of human energy while their fates are determined reflects large-scale organ-
ized, transnational activity. In the first instance, it owes its existence to the willingness of
governments-not all, but a substantial, well-endowed number of them-to co-operate.
This co-operation achieves organizational continuity through a corps of international civil
servants as well as officials of the sprawling network of non-governmental agencies. The
latter work with intergovernmental bodies and with national authorities that frequently
serve as executive arms. A substantial foundation of international law and concomitant
international practice reflects the successful efforts made in the past and offers a footing for
the future.
LEON GORDENKER, REFUGEES IN INTERNATIONAL POLITICS 11-12 (1987).
18. See infra part I.A.
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clear on its face, 19 the negotiating history of the Convention raises some
doubts as to the drafters' intentions. As a result of the work of the
United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees, as well as numerous
regional agreements, the obligation against refoulement has attained rec-
ognition as part of customary international law, quite apart from the
U.N. Convention.' The non-refoulement principle is generally recog-
nized as a universal obligation, but the territorial parameters of this obli-
gation remain unclear.
A. Early Uses
Prior to the 1950s, non-refoulement was not a part of international
practice. Nations were simply too concerned about surrendering any
sovereign authority over admittance of aliens at their borders to accept
such a potentially far-reaching obligation.21 The first multi-national ref-
erence to an obligation against refoulement appeared in the 1933 Con-
vention Relating to the International Status of Refugees. 2 Three years
later, the obligation appeared again in an agreement concerning refugees
coming from Germany. 3 Yet neither of these agreements was widely
19. See infra notes 33-42 and accompanying text.
20. See infra notes 65-70 and accompanying text.
21. In fact, this concern continues to be the single largest obstacle to expanding world refugee
protection. "[S]tates, even in these days of Communities, Councils, and other alliances, both com-
mercial and political, still jealously guard their sovereignty and do not welcome external interpreta-
tions of their domestic obligations." Roy McDowall, Co-ordination of Refugee Policy in Europe, in
REFUGEES AND INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS 179, 181 (Gil Loescher and Laila Monahan eds.,
1989). See also Hailbronner, supra note 7, at 866; GOODWIN-GILL, supra note 5, at 75. Members of
the United Nations have consistently failed to draft a treaty creating a right to asylum, once again
showing the reluctance of nation-states to give up this fundamental aspect of their sovereignty.
GOODWIN-GILL, supra note 5, at 77. See also Ved P. Nanda, Refugee Law and Policy, in REFUGEE
LAW AND POLICY 3, 9 (Ved P. Nanda ed., 1989).
22. Convention Relating to the International Status of Refugees, Oct. 28, 1933, art. 3, 159
L.N.T.S. 199, 205; See GOODWIN-GILL, supra note 5, at 70. Notably, the term refoulement was
used in this treaty, apparently referring solely to the practice of non-admittance at the frontier.
GOODWIN-GILL, supra note 5, at 70. Yet this convention went one step further, with each of the
contracting states undertaking "not to refuse entry to refugees at the frontiers of their countries of
origin." GOODWIN-GILL, supra note 5, at 70-71. Though the term refoulement was not used in
reference to this practice, the principle behind the obligation was clearly present.
23. Provisional Arrangement Concerning the Status of Refugees Coming from Germany, July
4, 1936, art. 4, 171 L.N.T.S. 75, 79. The language of this treaty was quite clear in preventing what
would later become known as refoulement. "Even in this last mentioned case the Governments
undertake that refugees shall not be sent back across the frontier of the Reich unless they have been
warned and have refused to make the necessary arrangements to proceed to another country or to
take advantage of the arrangements made for them with that object." Id., art 4(3), at 79 (emphasis
added).
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received, being signed by only eight and seven states, respectively.24
By the close of World War II, however, non-refoulement seemed to
have gained significant acceptance. Following the war, a tremendous
number of displaced persons were scattered across Western Europe.25
The United Nations Relief and Rehabilitation Administration (UN-
RRA) played a major role in assisting these displaced persons, primarily
in arranging for repatriation-return to their home country. 26 Yet the
UNRRA avoided forced repatriation, 27 implementing the moral resolve
of the victorious allies.21 The first wide-scale practice of non-refoulement
was directed at individuals without regard to where they were located.
B. The 1951 Convention
Article 33 of the U.N. Convention Relating to the Status of Refugees,
signed in 1951,29 is the first significant treaty obligation involving the
principle of non-refoulement.30 The language of the Convention suggests
24. Britain objected to the concept of non-return. GOODWIN-GILL, supra note 5, at 71. Com-
pare the limited acceptance of these treaties with the nearly universal acceptance of the 1951 U.N.
Convention, and the 1967 U.N. Protocol, which have been accepted by more than 110 countries.
25. In 1946, the United Nations assisted over 1.6 million refugees in Europe, while countless
others had already been admitted to countries of refuge. GOODWIN-GILL, supra note 5, at 71-72.
Ultimately the "[U.N. Relief and Rehabilitation Administration] helped some seven million people
return to their homes." GORDENKER, supra note 17, at 23.
26. GORDENKER, supra note 17, at 22-24.
27. Forced repatriation was generally avoided, though there were some exceptions. "[M]ore
than 2,000,000 war prisoners, refugees, forced laborers and turncoat soldiers were forced back to the
Soviet Union .. " GORDENKER, supra note 17, at 46 n. 5 (citing NICHOLAS BETHELL, THE LAST
SECRET: FORCIBLE REPATRIATION TO RuSSIA 1944-47 (1974) and NIKOLAI TOLSToI, THE SILENT
BETRAYAL (1978)). See also GOODWIN-GILL, supra note 5, at 72 n. 15 (citing ToLSTOY, VICTIMS
OF YALTA (1977, rev. ed. 1979)).
28. GORDENKER, supra note 17, at 24-25. Gordenker calls the refusal to "repatriate those who
did not want to leave" an "Arherican and Western European moral precept." Id. at 25.
29. U.N. Convention, supra note 4. The U.N. Convention did not actually come into force
until April 22, 1954, ninety days after the requisite six nations acceded in accordance with article 43.
U.N. Convention, supra note 4, at 150 n.1.
30. Earlier treaties making use of the non-refoulement concept had failed to achieve significant
international support. See supra Part IA. The obligations arising out of the U.N. Convention were
limited to a narrow set of circumstances. Notably, the definition of refugee applied only to persons
displaced prior to 1951. U.N. Convention, supra note 4, art. l(A)(2), at 152. "[T]he term 'refugee'
shall apply to any person who... As a result of events occurring before 1 January 1951.. ." U.N.
Convention, supra note 4, art. l(A)(2), at 152. Furthermore, signatories were given the option of
limiting their obligations to refugees fleeing events in Europe only. U.N. Convention, supra note 4,
art. l(B)(1), at 154. "For the purposes of this Convention, the words 'events occurring before I
January 1951' in article 1, section A, shall be understood to mean either (a) 'events occurring in
Europe before 1 January 1951'; or (b) 'events occurring in Europe or elsewhere before 1 January
1951'...." U.N. Convention, supra note 4, art. l(B)(1), at 154. Many of the contracting states
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_lawreview/vol71/iss3/9
1993] EXTRATERRITORIAL REPATRIATION PROGRAMS
that signatory states consented to an obligation not to return refugees
once they had crossed any international border.31 However, the negoti-
ating history indicates there may have been some disagreement over the
universality of this obligation.3 2
The language of the Convention appears to create an obligation that
accrues once asylum-seekers cross the frontier of their home country.
The plain language of Article 33 is clear-the text creates an obligation
prohibiting expulsion or return of refugees to the frontiers of territories
in which life or freedom would be threatened, with only two minor ex-
ceptions.33 Article 33 focuses on the actions of contracting states regard-
ing refugees as the term is defined in the Convention. 4 No limitation is
placed on the location of the refugees, which are defined in Article 1
simply with reference to the fact that they are outside their country of
nationality.35 To be considered a refugee the border of one's country of
origin must be crossed. Article 33 plainly and simply prohibits a con-
tracting state from forcibly returning a refugee to the hands of his or her
persecutors. The word "expel" unquestionably applies this prohibition
to state action conducted on refugees within the contracting state's
territory.36
chose the limited definition. In fact, two of the original six ratifying states opted to apply the defini-
tion only to individuals fleeing persecution in Europe. U.N. Convention, supra note 4, 137, 200-202.
This result might at first appear to indicate a retreat on the part of nations from a broad principle
of non-refoulement as expressed in the treatment of displaced persons immediately following World
War II. Yet the Convention must be viewed as a response to a narrow crisis which was seen, at the
time, to be temporary in nature. "The 1951 Refugee Convention was the outcome of extensive
negotiations among the major Western states to respond to the large number of displaced people in
post-war Europe and the continuous flow of refugees from Eastern Europe." Johan Cels, European
Responses to de facto Refugees, in REFUGEES AND INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS 187, 188 (Gil Loe-
scher and Laila Monahan eds., 1989).
31. See infra notes 33-42 and accompanying text.
32. See infra notes 43-46 and accompanying text.
33. The unequivocal prohibition is found in article 33(1) of the U.N. Convention. "No Con-
tracting state shall expel or return ('refouler') a refugee in any manner whatsoever to the frontiers of
territories where his life or freedom would be threatened on account of his race, religion, nationality,
membership of a particular social group or political opinion." U.N. Convention, supra note 4, art.
33(1), at 176. The adopted text also includes two exceptions: one for national security concerns and
one for dangerous criminals. U.N. Convention, supra note 4, art. 33(2), at 176.
34. The term "refugee" is defined in Article 1 of the U.N. Convention, supra note 4, at 152-56,
and modified by Article 1 of the U.N. Protocol, supra note 4, at 268-70. See supra note 11.
35. U.N. Convention, supra note 4, art. 1, at 152.
36. The word "'expel' . . . is a term of art in this setting, referring to the formal process of
removing an alien who was admitted to the country." Brief for Petitioner at n. 25, Sale v. Haitian
Centers Council, No. 92-344, 1993 WL 211610 (U.S. June 21, 1993). See also Brief for Respondents
at n. 22, Sale v. Haitian Centers Council, No. 92-344, 1993 WL 211610 (U.S. June 21, 1993).
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The only word with the potential for ambiguity, and the source of any
uncertainty regarding the non-refoulement obligation, is the word "re-
turn", which is followed in the English text by the French word
"refouler" in brackets.37 Words in treaties are generally given their ordi-
nary meaning, 38 and in this case the ordinary meaning of "return," and
for that matter "refouler," is simply to send back. 39 The preamble to the
Convention also makes clear the humanitarian context in which the Con-
vention was drafted, and the fundamental goal of providing protection
for refugees.' Granting refugees protection from refoulement once they
have left their country is more consistent with the plainly-stated goal of
assuring refugees the "widest possible exercise" of their rights and
freedoms.41
Finally, the Conference of Plenipotentiaries, responsible for drafting
the U.N. Convention, also adopted a concurrent resolution which en-
couraged signatories to extend the principles embodied in the Conven-
tion more broadly than the text required.42 Thus, from the official text of
the U.N. Convention, the right against refoulement appears to accrue to
refugees once they leave their country of origin.
At the conference adopting the Convention, however, there was some
37. The French word "refouler" has been translated to mean "to push back." See Brief for
Respondents at n.25, Sale v. Haitian Centers, Council, No. 92-344, 1993 WL 211610 (U.S. June 31,
1993). But see also Brief for Petitioners, at n.25, Sale v. Haitian Centers, Council, No. 92-344, 1993
WL 211610 (U.S. June 21, 1993).
38. See Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, U.N. GAOR Conference on the Law of
Treaties, 24th Sess., U.N. Doe. A/Conf.39/27 (1969), reprinted in 8 I.L.M. 679 (1969) [hereinafter
"Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties"].
39. WEBsTER's NEw COLLEGIATE DIcTIONARY 990 (1973). Though this is actually the third
listed definition of the transitive form of the word, it is the first one that captures the sense contextu-
ally. The others connote other meanings of the word "return" such as "to give (as an official ac-
count) to a superior" and "to bring, send, or put back to a former or proper place" (as a gun to its
holster). Id.
The U.S. Supreme Court has noted that "refouler" means more to repulse, repel, or drive back
than it means to send back. See infra note 140 and accompanying text. However, the practical
difference in meanings is not clear. See infra notes 145-46 and accompanying text.
40. The U.N. Convention was drafted because the U.N. had "manifested its profound concern
for refugees and endeavored to assure refugees the widest possible exercise of [their] fundamental
rights and freedoms." U.N. Convention, supra note 4, pmbl. at 150.
41. U.N. Convention, supra note 4, pmbl. at 150.
42. Resolution E stated:
The Conference Expresses the hope that the Convention relating to the Status of Refugees
will have value as an example exceeding the contractual scope and that all nations will be
guided by it in granting so far as possible to persons in their territory as refugees and who
would not be covered by the terms of the Convention, the treatment for which it provides.
U.N. Convention, supra note 4, Resolution E at 148.
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limited discussion regarding the extraterritorial applicability of the non-
refoulement obligation, which calls into doubt the apparent clarity of the
Convention's language. The main view expressed was that the obligation
exists only when a refugee is within the territory of a contracting state.43
The delegates from Switzerland and the Netherlands were adamant in
their national interpretations that non-refoulement does not apply until a
refugee is within the territory of a contracting state.44 These delegates
were concerned with the potential for a massive flow of refugees, and the
inability of a contracting state to deal effectively with a large influx of
people.45 These states felt it was important that they not be obligated to
refrain from rejecting refugees at the border. At that time, Switzerland
and the Netherlands were joined in this interpretation by several other
European nations, including Belgium, Germany, Italy, and Sweden.46
Thus, uncertainty about the extraterritorial application of the non-
refoulement obligation existed as early as the adoption of the U.N.
Convention.
C. Development of the Non-Refoulement Principle Following the
Convention
The Office of the U.N. High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR)
views non-refoulement as an obligation of states once a refugee crosses an
international boundary. In 1950, the United Nations established the
UNHCR while negotiations regarding the Convention were still under-
43. The distinction between being physically present or legally present in the contracting state
arose later as nations tried to further limit their obligations towards individuals who had arrived at
their shores, For instance, in the United States, there is a completely different statutory scheme for
lawfully admitted aliens who are seeking to remain (and avoid deportation), 8 U.S.C. § 1252(b)
(1992), than for illegal aliens seeking to remain (and avoid exclusion), 8 U.S.C. § 1226 (1992).
44. "In the Swiss Government's view, the term 'expulsion' applied to a refugee who had already
been admitted to the territory of a country. The term 'refoulement,' on the other hand, had a vaguer
meaning; it could not, however, be applied to a refugee who had not yet entered the territory of a
country. The word 'return,' used in the English text, gave that idea exactly." CONFERENCE OF
PLENIPOTENTIARIES ON THE STATUS OF REFUGEES AND STATELESS PERSONS SUMMARY RECORD
OF THE 16TH MEETING at 6, U.N. Doec. A/Conf. 2/SR.16 (July 11, 1951)(remarks of the Delegate
from Switzerland). Two weeks later, at the final meeting of the conference, the Netherlands delegate
reiterated the views of the Swiss delegate and asked that the conference adopt that view as the official
interpretation. No objection was raised to that suggestion.
45. CONFERENCE OF PLENIPOTENTIARIES ON THE STATUS OF REFUGEES AND STATELESS
PERSONS SUMMARY RECORD OF THE 35TH MEETING at 21, U.N. Doc. A/Conf. 2/SR.35 (July 25,
1951) (remarks of the Delegate from the Netherlands).
46. Id. See also Brief for Appellees at 44, Haitian Centers Council v. McNary, 969 F.2d 1350
(2nd Cir. 1992) (No. 92-6144), rev'dsub non Sale v. Haitian Centers Council, No. 92-344, 1993 WL
211610 (U.S. June 21, 1993).
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way.47 The statute establishing the UNHCR defined refugees in much
the same way as the Convention. a8 The UNHCR views its primary func-
tion as safeguarding the rights of refugees who are without the protection
of an independent sovereign government.49 The UNHCR intervenes
with the main objective of protecting the fundamental rights of the peo-
ple concerned, including the right of non-refoulement.50 Moreover, the
UNHCR sees non-refoulement as a limitation on a state's ability to expel
refugees or to reject them at the frontier.51 According to the UNHCR,
47. The purpose of this office was largely to offer protection to refugees. Perhaps the single
defining characteristic of refugees is the lack of protection of fundamental rights from their state of
origin. "[I]t is the lack of protection by their own government which distinguishes refugees from
ordinary aliens." GOODWIN-GILL, supra note 5, at 6. Thus, the UNHCR was designed to be the
source of protection for refugees. The first sentence of the statute gives the UNHCR "the function
of providing international protection.. . to refugees .. " Statute of the Office of the United Nations
High Commissioner for Refugees, G.A. Res. 428, U.N. GAOR, 5th Sess., 325 Plen. meeting, Annex,
Supp. No. 20, at 46, U.N. Doc. A/1775 (1950).
48. The only difference was that the statute did not include fear of persecution due to member-
ship in a particular social group. See supra note 11. This difference in definitions has had no practi-
cal consequence. GOODWIN-GILL, supra note 5, at 12.
The statute only granted the UNHCR the power to assist those people meeting the definition of
refugee. Yet the United Nations quickly expanded the role of the UNHCR by authorizing assistance
to people not technically refugees under the statute or Convention. For instance, in 1957, the
UNHCR helped Chinese asylum-seekers in Hong Kong, even though the asylum-seekers were not
technically within the definition of refugee in the statute. GOODWIN-GILL, supra note 5, at 7.
Notably, the UNHCR has expanded its protection to nearly all circumstances involving massive
flows of people across international frontiers. While political and social upheaval and domestic un-
rest following natural disasters were clearly not part of the original mandate of the UNHCR, such
events have repeatedly led to massive international flows of people, and the UNHCR has often
intervened on behalf of such people. The mandate of the UNHCR has expanded considerably over
time as a result of the actual practice of the UNHCR. Guy S. Goodwin-Gill notes:
[Tihe class of persons within the mandate of, or of concern to, UNHCR includes: (1) those
who, having left their country, can, on a case by case basis, be determined to have a well-
founded fear of persecution on certain specified grounds; and (2) those often large groups
or categories or persons who, likewise having crossed an international frontier, can be de-
termined or presumed to be without, or unable to avail themselves of, the protection of the
government of their state of origin. This is the broad meaning of the term 'refugee' for the
purposes of the United Nations....
GOODWIN-GILL, supra note 5, at 11-12.
49. Refugees cannot rely for protection on their country of origin, which they have fled, and
until they are granted asylum they can not rely on any other sovereign. See supra note 48. "Ensur-
ing that international protection is extended to refugees and other persons of concern to UNHCR
and facilitating durable solutions to their problems are the primary functions of the Office." 1992
Report of the UNHCR, supra note 1, 7, at 3.
50. 1992 Report of the UNHCR, supra note 1, 8, at 3. See also GOODWIN-GILL, supra note
5, at 10.
51. REPORT OF THE 28TH SESSION OF THE EXECUTIVE COMMITTEE OF THE HIGH COMMIS-
SIONER'S PROGRAMME, at t 53.4(c), U.N. Doc. A/AC.96/549 (1977); REPORT OF THE 30TH SES-
SION OF THE EXECUTIVE COMMITTEE OF THE HIGH COMMISSIONER'S PROGRAMME, at 72(2)(b),
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_lawreview/vol71/iss3/9
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Article 33 applies as soon as a refugee crosses an international boundary,
regardless of whether such a person has entered the territory of a con-
tracting state.52
The adoption of the 1967 Protocol Relating to the Status of Refugees
(Protocol) had no practical effect on the interpretation of the extraterri-
torial reach of the non-refoulement obligation. The Protocol expanded
the definition of "refugee" found in the 1951 U.N. Convention both tem-
porally and geographically. This change provided refugee protections,
including non-refoulement, to a broader class of people."3 However,
neither the Protocol nor the drafting conference addressed the issue of
the extraterritorial applicability of the non-refoulement principle.54
Regional agreements and municipal laws have also extended the obli-
gation against refoulement beyond the requirements of the U.N. Conven-
tion. Generally, however, little attention has been paid to the issue of
where a refugee must be to warrant protection against refoulement. In
particular, African5 5 and European states56 have held themselves to
U.N. Doc. A/AC.96/572 (1979); REPORT OF THE 32ND SESSION OF THE EXECUTIVE COMMITTEE
OF THE HIGH COMMISSIONER'S PROGRAMME, at % 57(2), U.N. Doc. A/AC.96/601 (1981).
52. The UNHCR has interpreted Article 33 to mean "that refugees must not be sent back to a
place where their lives or freedom would be threatened regardless of whether the State first en-
counters the refugee inside or outside its own territory." Brief of the Office of the United Nations
High Commissioner for Refugees as Amicus Curiae in Support of Respondents at n.7, Sale v. Hai-
tian Centers Council, No. 92-344, 1993 WL 211610 (U.S. June 21, 1993) (Lexis, Briefs file) [hereinaf-
ter "UNHCR Brief"). The main function of the UNHCR is to provide protection to refugees. See
supra note 49 and accompanying text. Any interpretation of Article 33 assuring refugees a right to
such protection only if they are fortuitous enough to reach the borders of another country would
turn the role of the UNHCR into a moral absurdity. It is not where the refugees are, but rather
where they are not that creates the need for protection.
53. Adoption of the Protocol extended refugee rights to people fleeing persecution after 1951,
and removed the option of restricting the definition of refugee to those fleeing events within Europe.
The Protocol was largely a recognition that refugee problems as a class were not limited in a tempo-
ral sense, and that the international community should recognize that as one crisis is "solved" an-
other will inevitably arise. See Weis, supra note 5, at 31. Furthermore, the geographic limitation on
the official definition allowed in the U.N. Convention was removed, extending refugee status and the
protection of non-refoulement to displaced persons everywhere. U.N. Protocol, supra note 4.
54. The 1967 Protocol was drafted by the Colloquium on Legal Aspects of Refugee Problems, a
group of legal experts outside of the United Nations, and thus there are no official records of the
drafting meetings. See Report of the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees, U.N. GAOR,
22nd Sess., Supp. No. 11, at 6, U.N. Doc. A/6711 (1967). Furthermore, the Protocol's language
simply changes the definition of "refugee" and incorporates by reference the 1951 Convention.
Thus, there was no discussion of Article 33 and the non-refoulement issue in drawing up the 1967
Protocol. See id.
55. See infra text accompanying notes 57-61.
56. See infra text accompanying notes 62-64.
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higher standards than those set forth in the U.N. Convention.
African states have extended protection to a broader class of people
than the U.N. Convention requires, and these states have clarified where
a refugee must be to invoke the non-refoulement obligation. Members of
the Organization for African Unity (O.A.U.)57 adopted a Convention
Governing the Specific Aspects of Refugee Problems in Africa (O.A.U.
Convention) 8 in 1968. In the O.A.U. Convention, the African states
expanded the definition of refugee to include massive refugee flows re-
sulting from political, social, and natural disasters5 9 African states have
thus extended fundamental refugee rights, including the right to avoid
refoulement, to a considerably broader set of people than required by the
U.N. Convention and Protocol.' The O.A.U. Convention is also more
clear than the U.N. Convention regarding the extraterritorial applicabil-
ity of the non-refoulement obligation when dealing with refugees who
have not reached a state's territory.6
European states have effectively extended the non-refoulement princi-
ple as well. In order to deal effectively with massive flows of asylum-
seekers, who generally did not qualify as refugees under the U.N. Con-
vention, European states developed a new concept called "B-status" or
de facto refugees. Asylum-seekers are granted this status when they fail
to meet the Convention's refugee definition, but humanitarian concern
makes their repatriation unpalatable. 2 Most importantly, these refugees
are protected against refoulement.63 The development of this de facto
refugee status has largely been on a municipal level in Europe. To date,
57. The O.A.U. is a multi-national political organization, with membership consisting of na-
tions on the African continent. In 1967, the 40 members were: Algeria, Botswana, Burundi, Came-
roon, Central African Republic, Chad, Congo, Dahomey, Equatorial Guinea, Ethiopia, Gabon,
Gambia, Ghana, Guinea, Ivory Coast, Kenya, Lesotho, Liberia, Libya, Madagascar, Malawi, Mali,
Mauritania, Mauritius, Morocco, Niger, Nigeria, Rwanda, Senegal, Sierra Leone, Somalia, Sudan,
Swaziland, Togo, Tunisia, Uganda, United Arab Republic, United Republic of Tanzania, Upper
Volta, and Zambia.
58. O.A.U. Convention, supra note 4.
59. For the precise language of the O.A.U. definition of the term "refugee" see supra note 11.
60. Weis, supra note 5, at 33.
61. O.A.U. Convention, supra note 4, art. 11(3), at 48 ("No person shall be subjected by a
Member State to measures such as rejection at the frontier, return or expulsion, which would compel
him to return to or remain in a territory where his life, physical integrity or liberty would be
threatened for the reasons set out in Article I, paragraphs I and 2.").
62. Cels, supra note 30, at 140, 192-93.
63. "The level of protection given to defacto refugees varies, but in nearly all European coun-
tries they may be granted a humanitarian status which protects them against refoulement ...." Cels,
supra note 30, at 188.
[Vol. 71:833
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_lawreview/vol71/iss3/9
19931 EXTRATERRITORIAL REPATRIATION PROGRAMS
there has been no clearly delineated policy regarding any extraterritorial
obligations.A
Today the concept of non-refoulement is probably part of general cus-
tomary international law, quite apart from conventional law. Interna-
tional law manifests itself in two basic forms: conventional law (i.e.,
treaty law) and customary law.65 The principle of non-refoulement is
indisputably a conventional obligation for the vast majority of states and
is found in numerous treaties.66 Whether non-refoulement has become
customary law, however, is a more difficult question. Yet the UNHCR
has observed that non-refoulement is a customary norm, and may have
risen to the level ofjus cogens.67 Numerous commentators hold similar
opinions.68 Unfortunately, in the field of international law, there is ex-
tremely limited case law to peruse for judicial interpretation. State prac-
tice, which is one of the best indications of what has become customary
law, 69 is inconsistent at best in this field.7 °
64. See infra notes 83-87 and 94-98 and accompanying text regarding Italian practice.
65. The Statute of the International Court of Justice lists as sources of international law "a)
international conventions, whether general or particular, establishing rules expressly recognized by
the contesting states; b) international custom, as evidence of a general practice accepted as law ......
Statute of the International Court of Justice, 59 Stat. 1055, art. 38, at 1060.
66. See supra notes 21-64 and accompanying text.
67. 1988 Report of the UNHCR, supra note 5, § 24, at 6. See also Report of the United Nations
High Commissioner for Refugees, U.N. GAOR, 40th Sess., Supp. No. 12, § 22, at 6, U.N. Doc.
E/1985/62 (1985).
A principle which has risen to the level ofjus cogens, otherwise known as a peremptory norm of
international law, is a legal principle so firmly rooted in the fabric of international law that it is
virtually unchangeable. The Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties describes such a principle as
"a norm from which no derogation is permitted and which can be modified only by a subsequent
norm of general international law having the same character." Vienna Convention on the Law of
Treaties, supra note 38, at 8 I.L.M. 679, art. 53, 698-99.
68. "[Today the principle forms part of general international law. There is substantial, if not
conclusive, authority that the principle is binding in all states, independently of specific assent."
GOODWIN-GILL, supra note 5, at 97; see also GOODWIN-GILL, supra note 5, at 97-100; "Due to its
repeated reaffirmation at the universal, regional, and national levels, the principle of non-refoulement
has now become characterized as a peremptory norm (jus cogens) for this hemisphere." Karen
Parker, The Rights of Refugees under International Humanitarian Law, in REFUGEE LAW AND
POLICY 33, at n.17 (Ved P. Nanda ed., 1989).
69. Customary law exists with the presence of "two distinct elements (1) 'general practice' and
(2) its acceptance as law." Louis HENKIN, ET AL., INTERNATIONAL LAW 37 (1987). Without a
consistent practice, it is difficult to claim that a principle is a customary law.
70. See infra part II.
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II. INTERNATIONAL INTERPRETATIONS OF THE NON-REFOULEMENT
OBLIGATION IN PRACTICE
States have varied significantly in how they have interpreted when
their non-refoulement obligations arise. Though certainly the obligation
only accrues to people who fit the definition of refugee, there is consider-
able disagreement over exactly who should fit the definition.71 Further-
more, political exigencies have given rise to varying levels of commitment
to the non-refoulement obligation.72 In fact, some states have shifted
their official interpretation to fit the political climate. Generally, there
are three views of when the obligation to screen, and ultimately provide
protection, arises. Some states have embraced a preference for limiting
the obligation to refugees who are legally present within their state.73
Other states require a refugee simply to be physically present within their
territory.74 The practice of yet another group of states extends the pro-
tection of non-refoulement to refugees regardless of where they may be
located, as long as they have left the boundaries of their home country.75
A. Legally Present
Several states have extended non-refoulement protection only to refu-
gees who have arrived legally in their territory. The U.N. Convention is
explicit in prohibiting discrimination against asylum-seekers based on the
legality or illegality of their presence.76 Nevertheless, when threatened
with a massive influx of refugees, several nations have fallen back on this
approach as a means of justifying what would otherwise be clear trans-
gressions against international non-refoulement obligations. Generally,
significant international protest follows these practices.77
71. The debate over the breadth of the definition of the term "refugee" lurks just beneath the
surface of the issue addressed by this Note. To some extent, without a precise definition of who is a
refugee to whom the obligation of non-refoulement applies, any discussion of the obligation of non-
refoulement is incomplete. The discussion in this Note adopts the definition of refugee from the
U.N. Protocol because that is the most widely-used definition. For an excellent discussion of the
problems surrounding a more general definition, see Hailbronner, supra note 7.
72. This has been true in several countries, including Thailand, see infra notes 78-82 and ac-
companying text, and Italy, see infra notes 83-87 and 94-98.
73. See infra part II.A.
74. See infra part II.B.
75. See infra part II.C.
76. U.N. Convention, supra note 4, art. 31, at 174. "The Contracting States shall not impose
penalties, on account of their illegal entry or presence, on refugees .. " Id.
77. For example, significant international pressure was applied against Thailand, see infra notes
78-82 and accompanying text, and Italy, see infra notes 94-98.
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Thailand's practice of turning back Vietnamese boats from harbor and
sending them back to sea provides one of the most dramatic examples of
this approach.7" In the late 1970s, Thailand pursued a policy of rejection
at the border and refoulement without determining refugee status, and
subjected thousands of boat people to peril at sea or jeopardy at home.
Though this policy was ended in 1980 as a result of a United Nations
brokered resettlement plan, a resurgence of Vietnamese refugees in 1988
once again led to "push-backs. ' 79  The Vietnamese turned away were
clearly within the territorial limits of Thailand,8" but they were not af-
forded a screening opportunity.81 Thailand thus embraced a policy of
78. News accounts of this practice are disturbing:
The exodus of the "boat people" from Vietnam reached its peak in 1979, when as many
as 50,000 people were fleeing by sea each month. Thailand, by virtue of its geography, was
the hardest-hit country of first asylum. At the same time that Vietnamese boats were piling
up on Thai beaches, tens of thousands of Cambodians were fleeing over Thailand's eastern
border, and like numbers of Laotians were fleeing across its northern border. Faced with
feeding and housing this increasing accumulation of unwanted humanity, with little mean-
ingful help from the outside world, Thailand took drastic measures. Thai naval vessels
began towing Vietnamese back out to sea in their leaky boats, condemning many of them
to certain death. In June, 1979, the Thais rounded up 40,000 Cambodian refugees and
forced them at gunpoint to re-enter their own country down a steep escarpment into a
heavily mined field. Ten thousand people died in the exercise, either from exploding mines
or from Thai gunfire when they tried to turn back.
William Mullen, No Place Called Home, CHI. TRIB., Oct. 9, 1988, Sunday Magazine, at 12, 18. In
1980, the United Nations brokered a plan of action for the refugees, creating resettlement options in
the West in exchange for an end to the "push-backs". Id.
79. The policy reversal in 1980 has generally held, although there have been some resurgences.
In the mid-1980s, the number of Vietnamese fleeing their homeland decreased, while the numbers
resettled from first asylum countries in South-East Asia to countries in the West increased. In fact,
some thought "the problem of refugee buildup in Asia would go away." Nick B. Williams Jr. and
Mark Fineman, Refugees Now Being Urged to Go Back to Vietnam; Positions Harden in Crisis Over
"Boat People", L.A. TIMES, Dec. 20, 1988, at 13-14. Then in 1988, in Thailand, the numbers of
incoming refugees exploded. Particularly in the "Trat province, on the eastern shore along the
Cambodian border. [In] December [of 1987] and January [of 1988], boat people began arriving at
the rate of 2,000 a month." Id. This led to a resurgence of push-backs. Id.
80. The territorial limit extends out to sea twelve nautical miles. In fact, a nation maintains
some policing authority up to twenty-four miles out to sea. RESTATEMENT OF THE FOREIGN RELA-
TIONS LAW OF THE UNITED STATES (REVISED) § 511 (1986) (statement of general international
law).
81. Thailand is not a party to the 1951 Convention or the 1967 Protocol. However, as noted
above, the principle of non-refoulement is often considered part of customary international law, de-
riving its force not from treaty obligations but rather from the general practice of nations. See supra
notes 65-70 and accompanying text. Notably, Thailand has absorbed a considerable number of refu-
gees over the past decade. In most situations, Thailand pursues a screening procedure to determine
refugee status, and provides asylum or resettlement assistance to those considered refugees. 1992
WORLD REFUGEE SURVEY, supra note 1, at 65. See also U.S. COMMITTEE FOR REFUGEES, 1991
WORLD REFUGEE SURVEY 66 (Virginia Hamilton ed., 1991).
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non-refoulement only for those legally present.8 2
In early 1991, thousands of Albanians arrived at the shores of Italy
seeking asylum.8 3 Italy initially provided a screening opportunity for all
arriving Albanians.84 In August of that year, after Italy believed that the
tide of refugees had subsided,85 thousands of Albanians arrived again.8 6
Italy refused to screen the asylum-seekers to identify bona-fide refugees
and returned all of the Albanians to Albania. 7 Italy, too, interpreted its
non-refoulement obligation as extending only to those legally present.
The situation of the Iraqi Kurds presents a third example of the legally
present approach. In 1991, on the heels of the allied victory in the Gulf
War, Iraqi Kurds revolted in northern Iraq.88 The revolt was quashed
by the Iraqi army,89 and thousands of Iraqi Kurds fled to Turkey. 9° Tur-
key, however, closed its borders to these Kurds and refused entry.91 No
screening procedures were instituted; rather, entrance was summarily de-
nied to all Kurds. Those Kurds who managed to cross the border were
82. Due to considerable international pressure, Thailand has retreated from its "push-back"
policy and instituted screening procedures for those arriving in Thai ports. Thailand now appears to
follow a policy of non-refoulement for those physically present. 1992 WORLD REFUGEE SURVEY,
supra note 1, at 65.
83. 1992 WORLD REFUGEE SURVEY, supra note 1, at 75-77.
84. See infra notes 94-98 and accompanying text.
85. In a letter dated August 1, 1991, the Italian Embassy stated "[I]t appears that the arrival of
Albanians via the seaboard has ended, and thus the question of sending them back is irrelevant....
[A] month or so ago the last ones who attempted to reach Italy in this manner were intercepted at
sea and accompanied back to Albania. From that moment the phenomenon has stopped." Letter
from Italian Embassy in the United States to the United States Committee for Refugees (August 1,
1991) (quoted in 1992 WORLD REFUGEE SURVEY, supra note 1, at 76). On August 18, a second
wave of Albanians arrived at Italian ports. 1992 WORLD REFUGEE SURVEY, supra note 1, at 76.
86. It is reported that 17,000 Albanians arrived at Bai harbor, 14,000 on one ship arriving on
August 8. 1992 WORLD REFUGEE SURVEY, supra note 1, at 76.
87. 1992 WORLD REFUGEE SURVEY, supra note 1, at 76.
88. Ann Devroy and John E. Yang, Bush Orders Airlift of Aid to Refugees, WASH. POST, Apr.
6,1991, at Al.
89. Id.
90. Four hundred fifty-two thousand asylum-seekers were reported by the United States Com-
mittee for Refugees, over four thousand of which are still inside Turkey. 1992 WORLD REFUGEE
SURVEY, supra note 1, at 81.
91. Turkey found itself faced with a problem it thought it had seen before. At the outset of the
1991 crisis, in April, the Turkish government decided not to repeat what it viewed as its earlier
mistake. In 1988 Turkey received much criticism from Western countries for its treatment of the
Kurdish refugees, but very little support. In announcing the decision not to admit the Kurds, but
instead to provide "humanitarian aid" at the border, Turkish Minister of State Kamran Inan said,
"The world did nothing then [i.e., after 1988] to help us house and feed the refugees." 1992 WORLD
REFUGEE SURVEY, supra note 1, at 82.
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returned to Iraq.92 Turkey thus adopted a policy extending its obligation
against refoulement only to those refugees legally in Turkish territory.93
B. Physically Present
In contrast to requiring legal presence of refugees before any non-
refoulement obligation arises, many states simply require physical pres-
ence as a prerequisite. For example, when Albanians first began fleeing
en masse to Italy in 1991, Italy extended protection against refoulement
to all Albanians physically present in Italy, and the Italian authorities
conducted proper screening.94 The initial arrivals, in March of that year,
were treated fairly under a new Italian immigration law.95 Italy insti-
tuted screening procedures, permitted appeals, and ultimately allowed
over five percent to remain.96 At the same time, however, Italy instituted
an interdiction program in the Adriatic. Italian vessels tracked ships
headed for its shores and escorted them back to Albania.97 Those who
were fortunate enough to reach Italian shores were screened, and refu-
gees were protected against refoulement. Those not reaching Italian
shores fared worse, and were subjected to forced repatriation without
screening. Thus, when first confronted with a massive refugee problem,
Italy embraced a policy of non-refoulement only for those physically
92. "Any who ventured more than a hundred yards or so into Turkey were pushed back by
Turkish soldiers, firing warning shots in the air." 1992 WORLD REFUGEE SURVEY, supra note 1, at
82.
93. Turkey acceded to the U.N. Convention in 1962. Turkey has limited its definition of refu-
gee to include only those fleeing persecution in Europe, pursuant to the terms of its original acces-
sion. 424 U.N.T.S. 349, 350 (Mar. 30, 1962). However, the obligation against refoulement extends
beyond mere treaty obligations, as it is generally viewed as part of customary international law. See
supra notes 65-70 and accompanying text. The United States built tent cities in Northern Iraq and a
considerable number of refugees returned to Iraq voluntarily. 1992 WORLD REFUGEE SURVEY,
supra note 1, at 82. Nevertheless, the Turkish policy of refusing entrance, particularly without
screening, indicates a clear interpretation of the non-refoulement principle.
94. 1992 WORLD REFUGEE SURVEY, supra note 1, at 75.
95. Italy historically has had very liberal provisions regarding asylum-seekers. In anticipation
of open borders in the European Community, Italy amended its laws in 1990, to conform to prac-
tices of the European community, creating more stringent requirements for asylum-seekers than had
previously been in place. 1992 WORLD REFUGEE SURVEY, supra note 1, at 75. The Albanians
arriving in March were screened under the new procedures, and refugee status was granted accord-
ing to Italy's new commitments.
96. In 1990, prior to the massive influx of Albanians, the percentage of asylum-seekers granted
asylum was approximately 59%. As a result of the mass arrivals in 1991, the ratio of those granted
asylum to those seeking it dropped to 5.5%. 1992 WORLD REFUGEE SURVEY, supra note I, at 75.
97. 1992 WORLD REFUGEE SURVEY, supra note 1, at 76.
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present.98
The United States has also apparently embraced a non-refoulement
policy based on physical presence, though like Italy, the U.S. position has
shifted over time.99 The U.S. Supreme Court has recently held that the
United States' obligation regarding non-refoulement only extends to refu-
gees physically present within the United States."
Since 1981, the United States has pursued a policy of tracking Haitian
nationals 01 fleeing the oppressive military regime in power in Haiti, in-
tercepting them in international waters, and returning them to Haiti. 102
Originally, the U.S. Coast Guard conducted a screening process to deter-
mine if any Haitians warranted "refugee" status which might entitle
them to protection from refoulement. The original U.S. policy thus ac-
cepted a non-refoulement obligation extending into international waters
and not requiring any sort of presence in the United States. 103 However,
the situation in Haiti deteriorated in late September 1991.1° In May
1992 President Bush issued the Kennebunkport Order, 105 which shifted
U.S. policy away from mandatory screenings. 10 6
This shift in policy indicated a new American interpretation requiring
physical presence in the United States before the non-refoulement obliga-
98. Subsequently, Italy abandoned its policy of protection for those physically present due to a
resurgence of asylum-seekers. See supra notes 83-87 and accompanying text.
99. See infra notes 103-06 and accompanying text.
100. See infra part III.
101. The term "national" is a term of art in the field of immigration law, and is defined as "[a]
person owing permanent allegiance to a state." 8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(21) (1992). It has a broader
meaning than "citizen". BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 1024 (6th ed. 1990).
102. Executive Order 12,324, 46 Fed. Reg. 48,109 (1981).
103. See infra notes 119-123 and accompanying text.
104. On September 30, 1991, the democratically-elected President of Haiti, Jean-Bertrand Aris-
tide, was overthrown in a military coup. Following the coup, a massive increase in the migration
from Haiti transpired. The United States suspended its program of repatriation, and initiated a
program of interdiction and temporary encampment at Guantanamo Bay, Cuba. Mike Clary, US.
Pushes for Haitian Resettlement Plan, L.A. TIMES, Nov. 16, 1991, at A21. On November 18, 1991,
the United States resumed its repatriation policy. See U.S. Judge Halts Return ofHaitians, CHI.
TRID., Nov. 20, 1991, at 6. The increase in asylum-seekers from the coup ultimately led to the May
24, 1992 executive order that changed U.S. policy and denied screening to the Haitian asylum-
seekers. Id.
105. Executive Order 12,807 1992, 57 Fed. Reg. 23,133 (1992).
106. "[Tihe Attorney General, in his unreviewable discretion, may decide that a person who is a
refugee will not be returned without his consent... Executive Order No. 12324 is hereby revoked
and replaced by this order." Executive Order 12,807, supra note 105 (emphasis added). The lan-
guage in the 1981 presidential order, deferring to the laws of the United States and international
obligations, was also deleted. See infra note 122 and accompanying text.
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tion arises. This new policy was challenged in the United States
courts, 10 7 where the government argued that the obligation of non-
refoulement does not arise until refugees are physically present in the
United States. 108 The U.S. Supreme Court recently upheld this policy,109
which has been continued by the new President.110 U.S. practice, at least
currently, embraces a non-refoulement obligation only once a refugee
reaches American soil.
C. Anywhere Found
While some states have taken a narrow view of their non-refoulement
obligations, other states have granted protection to refugees regardless
where found. African states have taken a particularly liberal view to-
wards treatment of refugees and the concept of non-refoulement.111 Re-
gardless of where they are found, asylum-seekers in Africa are generally
protected from refoulement. The United States has also indicated a pref-
107. See infra part III.
108. "Article 33 applies only to refugees who have entered the territory of a contracting state."
Brief for Appellees at 37, Haitian Centers Council v. McNary, 969 F.2d 1350 (2nd Cir. 1992)(No.
92-6144), rev'd sub nom. Sale v. Haitian Centers Council, 1993 WL 211610 (U.S. June 21, 1993).
The government based its argument on four points: 1) Article 33 does not expressly state that it is to
apply extraterritorially; 2) the negotiating history indicates a view against extraterritorial applica-
tion; 3) U.S. obligations at the time of accession to the U.N. Protocol only extended to aliens within
the United States; and 4) the State Department has always interpreted U.S. obligations under Article
33 to apply only to refugees within the United States. Id. at 37-50.
109. Sale v. Haitian Centers Council, No. 92-344, 1993 WL 211610 (U.S. June 21, 1993).
110. Timothy J. McNulty, Clinton Reverses Course on Haitians, CHI. TRiB., Jan. 15, 1993, at 5.
111. Prior to this century, Africa was heavily colonized, and the independent nations that ulti-
mately emerged bore little relationship to the one-time dominant tribal system. The effects of this
colonial domination on the African approaches to Western legalism are significant.
By the beginning of this century, seven European states had practically divided all of Af-
rica among themselves, while the descendants of the eighth had dug their teeth deeply into
South Africa. Only Ethiopia and Liberia remained free. This was the time when frontiers
in Africa were drawn with straightedge rulers at conference tables in Europe, regardless of
the peoples whose destinies were influenced by these decisions. Today's political map of
Africa shows that these straight lines cut through tribes, clans, and families and split up
ecological units, pasture grounds, and market areas.
Peter Nobel, Refugees, Law, and Development in Africa, in TRANSNATIONAL LEGAL PROBLEMS OF
REFUGEES 255, 256-57 (Michigan Yearbook of International Legal Studies ed., 1982).
Thus, in many ways the modern African nation-states are not nearly as concerned with traditional
notions of sovereignty as their Western counterparts. See id. at 256-57 and 265-66. Most of the
modern African states won their independence in the 1960s. By the end of that decade there was a
mounting refugee crisis on the continent. The Organization for African Unity (O.A.U.) adopted the
O.A.U. Convention Governing the Specific Aspects of Refugee Problems in Africa in 1969. See
supra notes 57-61 and accompanying text. Following adoption of the O.A.U. Convention, African
states have generally followed a consistent approach to refugee non-refoulement. See infra notes
113-118 and accompanying text. See also supra note 61.
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erence for this interpretation at times. 112
Cte d'Ivoire absorbed nearly 240,000 refugees from Liberia in De-
cember 1989 and at the beginning of 1990.113 Despite the difficulties as-
sociated with this absorption, Cte d'Ivoire pursued an open policy
during 1990 and much of 1991. By late 1991, however, Cte d'Ivoire
began screening new arrivals to determine refugee status (granting this
status to greater than 50%). 114 Yet Cte d'Ivoire has not sent any Liber-
ians back to Liberia, even those who have failed to attain refugee sta-
tus. 15 Cte d'Ivoire thus pursues a policy against refoulement in all
situations.
Malawi has allowed nearly a million refugees from Mozambique to
enter since 1976 due to a brutal civil war in Mozambique.' 6 Refugees
now constitute more than ten percent of Malawi's total population.' 17
Despite the hardships this has caused and a decrease in U.N. funds,
Malawi has remained committed to admitting refugees and avoiding
refoulement.118
112. See infra notes 119-123 and accompanying text.
113. 1992 WORLD REFUGEE SURVEY, supra note 1, at 38.
114. 1992 WORLD REFUGEE SURVEY, supra note 1, at 39.
115. 1992 WORLD REFUGEE SURVEY, supra note 1, at 39.
116. The United States Committee for Refugees reported 982,000 refugees. 1992 WORLD REFU-
GEE SURVEY, supra note 1, at 46.
117. There are over 982,000 refugees in Malawi, while the total population is approximately 9.4
million. 1992 WORLD REFUGEE SURVEY, supra note 1, at 35 (Table 7).
118. 1992 WORLD REFUGEE SURVEY, supra note 1, at 46. Response to refugee flows in Africa
has not been without some inconsistencies. Sandwiched between warring Ethiopia and Somalia,
Djibouti has had to deal with refugees from the outset of its independence in 1978. 1992 World
Refugee Survey, supra note 1, at 39. Almost a third of the population is comprised of refugees-
120,000 refugees out of a total population of nearly 400,000. 1992 WORLD REFUGEE SURVEY,
supra note 1, at 40. Though Djibouti has generally been accommodating to refugees, Djibouti has
also forcibly repatriated some refugees. Events in Ethiopia in mid-1991 prompted a massive influx of
some 49,000 Ethiopians. 1992 WORLD REFUGEE SURVEY, supra note 1, at 40; see also Michael A.
Hiltzik, Rebel Troops Attack Capital of Ethiopia, L.A. TIMEs, May 28, 1991, at Al, A16 ("The
Eritrean rebels Saturday [May 25, 1991] also took Assab, the last major Red Sea port held by the
government and a vital fuel supply source for Addis Ababa. That action provoked the outflow of
about 30,000 refugees, including deserting soldiers and citizens of the city."). In order to encourage
"voluntary" repatriation, Djibouti did not allow a full opportunity to apply for asylum. "Djibouti
authorities, anxious that the Ethiopians---especially the soldiers-leave, reportedly did not fully pro-
vide the Ethiopians an opportunity to apply for asylum." 1992 WORLD REFUGEE SURVEY, supra
note 1, at 40.
Perhaps the most graphic example of a lessened standard regarding refoulement in Africa in-
volved Kenya in May 1991. Like Djibouti, Kenya borders both Ethiopia and Somalia. Due to
increasing tensions in 1991, a considerable number of refugees began fleeing to Kenya. In April and
May of 1991, several ships carrying Somalis were turned back from Kenyan ports and sent back to
sea. This unusual display of rejection at an African border, which ultimately led to some deaths,
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_lawreview/vol71/iss3/9
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United States policy regarding the extraterritorial applicability of the
non-refoulement obligation has been inconsistent, though at times the
United States has indicated its non-refoulement obligations arise once ref-
ugees leave their home country. When the United States began interdict-
ing ships carrying asylum-seekers fleeing Haiti in 1981,119 all intercepted
Haitians were screened to determine if any were bona fide refugees.12
The Executive Order authorizing the interceptions clearly restricted the
practice to international waters,121 and required observance of "interna-
tional obligations."' 22 At a minimum, the language of this Executive Or-
der implied that the U.S. believed it was under some international
obligation regarding asylum-seekers in international waters. In any
event, this policy provided screening to determine refugee status for asy-
lum-seekers who had not yet arrived in the territory of the United States.
The United States continued this policy for over ten years before aban-
doning it in 1992.123
III. JUDICIAL INTERPRETATIONS
As is true with many questions of international law, 124 judicial inter-
came under considerable international protest. 1992 WORLD REFUGEE SURVEY, supra note 1, at
43.
Nevertheless, even these states generally accept a non-refoulement obligation regardless where
refugees are found. See supra note 61.
119. See supra text accompanying notes 101-02.
120. Executive Order 12,324, 46 Fed. Reg. 48,109 (1981). The order instructed the Coast Guard
to stop certain defined vessels on the high seas, to "make inquiries of those on board... as are
necessary... to establish [their status]", and to "return the vessel and its passengers to the country
from which it came, when there is reason to believe that an offense is being committed against the
United States immigration laws, or appropriate laws of a foreign country with which [the United
States has] an arrangement to assist; provided, however, that no person who is a refugee will be
returned without his consent." Id.
121. Id. The order authorized interception and screening "only outside the territorial waters of
the United States." Id.
122. Id. The order required "strict observance of our international obligations concerning those
who genuinely flee persecution in their homeland." Id.
123. See supra notes 99-110 and accompanying text.
124. Procedural and jurisdictional problems limit considerably the availability of domestic
courts to resolve international law issues. International tribunals primarily exist to resolve disputes
between states, rather than between a state and individuals.
Among the most serious deficiencies in international law is the frequent absence of an
assured procedure for the identification of a violation. Theoretical inquiry can clarify the
problem and provide some insight into the solution. The status of controverted behavior as
legal or illegal is quite problematical, in the first instance, because no central institutions
exist to make judgments that will be treated as authoritative by states. This is the familiar
weakness of international law that results from reliance upon self-interpretation to discern
the scope of permissible behavior.
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pretations are scarce regarding the non-refoulement obligation. The U.S.
Supreme Court only recently provided some guidance regarding when
the non-refoulement and screening obligations arise. The several courts
that addressed the issue prior to the Supreme Court's decision disagreed
over the appropriate interpretation. 12  Three circuit courts126 addressed
this issue in the context of the Haitian situation. These courts focused
their analysis primarily on obligations arising from § 243(h)(1) of the Im-
migration and Nationality Act127 (INA), which is a domestic law based
on Article 33 of the U.N. Convention.1 28 Two circuits found United
States obligations to exist only when an alien is physically present in the
United States.129 However, neither of these courts discussed the merits
of the international law question at length. One circuit, however, care-
fully analyzed the non-refoulement issue, and decided that the United
States obligations extend to wherever the alien may be found."' This
circuit's decision was reversed by the Supreme Court, which found Arti-
Richard A. Falk, The Adequacy of Contemporary Theories of International Law-Gaps in Legal
Thinking, 50 VA. L. REV. 231, 249 (1964).
125. Further complicating the analyses of these courts are a variety of procedural and domestic
law issues which are beyond the scope of this Note.
126. The D.C. Circuit addressed this issue in Haitian Refugee Center v. Gracey, 809 F.2d 794
(D.C. Cir. 1987) (requiring physical presence). The Eleventh Circuit addressed this issue in two
cases by the same name: Haitian Refugee Center v. Baker, 949 F.2d 1109 (11th Cir. 1991) [hereinaf-
ter "HRC I"] and Haitian Refugee Center v. Baker, 953 F.2d 1498 (1 1th Cir. 1992) (requiring
physical presence), cert. denied, - U.S. -, 112 S. Ct. 1245 (1992) [hereinafter "HRC II"]. The
Second Circuit addressed this issue in Haitan Centers Council v. McNary, 969 F.2d 1350 (2nd Cir.
1992) (extending protection extraterritorially), rev'd sub nom. Sale v. Haitian Centers Council, No.
92-344, 1993 WL 211610 (U.S. June 21, 1993).
127. 8 U.S.C. § 1253(h)(1) (1992). "The Attorney General shall not deport or return any alien
... to a country if the Attorney General determines that such alien's life or freedom would be
threatened in such country on account of race, religion, nationality, membership in a particular
social group, or political opinion." Id.
128. The U.S. Supreme Court has made note of the basis for § 243(h)(1):
If one thing is clear from the legislative history of the new definition of "refugee," and
indeed the entire 1980 Act, it is that one of Congress' primary purposes was to bring
United States refugee law into conformance with the 1967 United Nations Protocol Relat-
ing to the Status of Refugees to which the United States acceded in 1968. Indeed, the
definition of "refugee" that Congress adopted is virtually identical to the one prescribed by
Article 1(2) of the Convention. ...
INS v. Cardoza-Fonseca, 480 U.S. 421, 436-37 (1987)(citations omitted); see also INS v. Stevic, 467
U.S. 407, 421 (1984).
129. See supra note 126.
130. The Second Circuit addressed this issue in Haitian Centers Council v. McNary, 969 F.2d
1350 (2nd Cir. 1992), rey'd sub nom. Sale v. Haitian Centers Council, No. 92-344, 1993 WL 211610
(U.S. June 21, 1993).
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cle 33 to apply only once an individual was physically within the United
States.
In Sale v. Haitian Centers Council, Inc., 31 the Supreme Court found
that the United States was obligated to avoid the refoulement of only
those aliens within the territorial boundaries of the United States. 13 2
While focusing its analysis upon domestic law, 133 the Supreme Court ex-
plored the meaning of Article 33 because that article gave rise to the
domestic law in this field. The Court gave three reasons why the obliga-
tions in Article 33 cannot apply extraterritorially: (1) the explicit refer-
ence in Article 33.2 to the country in which a refugee is found; (2) the
parallel use of the terms "expel" and "return" in Article 33.1; and (3) the
negotiating history of the Convention itself.134
Article 33.2 exempts contracting states from the prohibition of non-
refoulement when a refugee presents a danger to the security of the con-
tracting state.135 The exemption applies when a refugee is a security risk
to the "country in which he is .... ,a136 The Supreme Court held that
because Article 33.2 only applied to a refugee within the territory of a
country, Article 33.1 must also apply only to refugees within the terri-
tory of a country. The Court found that to hold otherwise would be
unreasonable because refugees posing a security risk who were found on
the high seas would be protected against refoulement while those posing
a security risk within a country would not.137
The Court next found that the word "return" in Article 33 was in-
tended to refer to the process that applies to aliens physically present
though not legally present within the territory of that state. In the
United States, aliens who have legally arrived are subject to deportation,
while aliens who are illegally within the country are subject to exclu-
131. No. 92-344, 1993 WL 211610 (U.S. June 21, 1993).
132. Id.
133. Domestic law in the United States was enacted to comply with the U.N. Protocol. See
supra notes 127-28.
134. Haitian Centers Council, 1993 WL 211610, at *10-*13.
135. Article 33(2) actually establishes two exceptions to the non-refoulement obligation:
The benefit of [Article 33(1)] may not, however, be claimed by a refugee whom there are
reasonable grounds for regarding as a danger to the security of the country in which he is,
or who, having been convicted by a final judgment of a particularly serious crime, consti-
tutes a danger to the community of that country.
U.N. Convention, supra note 4, art. 33(2), at 176.
136. Id.
137. Haitian Centers Council, 1993 WL 211610, at *10.
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sion. 138 The Court found that the word "return" has the same meaning
as "exclude." '139 The basis of the Court's decision is unclear. The Court
appears to have relied upon the remarks of commentators near the time
of the original drafting of the U.N. Convention, and on the belief that
"return" and "refouler" do not mean the same thing."4 Yet the Court
failed to explain how it reached the legal conclusion that "return" has a
special, limited meaning as it is used in the U.N. Convention.
Finally, the Court placed great emphasis upon the negotiating history
of the U.N. Convention.14 The Court noted the interpretation of the
words "expel" and "return" favored by several European countries at the
drafting conference limited the word "expel" to apply to a refugee al-
ready admitted into a country and limited the word "return" to apply to
a refugee already within the territory of a country but not yet residing
there. 42 The Court then found that even if some signatory states viewed
the obligations of Article 33 to apply wherever an alien might be located,
certainly other states "carefully-and successfully-sought to avoid just
that implication."' 14 3
The lone dissent in Haitian Centers Council found the obligations of
Article 33 to apply extraterritorially. Justice Blackmun, in a scathing
dissent, focused primarily upon the obligations of the U.N. Convention.
Blackmun found the plain language of Article 33.1 to be unambiguous
and reliance upon the negotiating history to be misguided.
Blackmun found the use of the term "return" to be unambiguous. He
noted that treaties are usually construed according to their ordinary
meaning, and that the majority's insistence on giving the word "return" a
more narrow legal meaning is inconsistent with this general canon of
treaty interpretation. 144 Taking the meaning ascribed to the word
refouler in the French-English dictionaries quoted by the majority,
138. See 8 U.S.C. § 1252(b) (1992) (regarding deportation) and 8 U.S.C. § 1226 (1992) (regard-
ing exclusion).
139. Haitian Centers Council, 1993 WL 211610, at *10 ("the term 'return (refouler)' refers to the
exclusion of aliens").
140. Id. at n.40 (commentators opinions), and Id. at *11 (the definitions of "return" and
"refouler"). The Court found that the meaning of the French word "refouler" controlled the mean-
ing of "return" in Article 33. Because "refouler" means "repulse, repel, drive back," the Court
found that for the purposes of the U.N. Convention, "'return' means a defensive act of resistance or
exclusion at a border rather than an act of transporting someone to a particular destination." Id.
141. Id. at *11-13. See also supra notes 43-46 and accompanying text.
142. See supra note 44.
143. Haitian Centers Council, 1993 WL 211610, at *13.
144. Id. at *15 (Blackmun, J., dissenting). See also supra note 38.
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Blackmun found that even though the word "return" is not among the
definitions, the other words used in English to describe the meaning of
refouler described the United States' action in this case precisely. 45
Blackmun even noted that current articles in French newspapers used
the word refouler to describe the repatriation program being conducted
by the United States.'" Next, Blackmun dismissed the majority's analy-
sis of Article 33.2. Blackmun observed that simply because the U.N.
Convention permits contracting states to return serious criminals once
they have arrived within the borders of a contracting state in no way
implies that contracting states intended to allow the return of people who
are not criminals and who are found outside of the contracting state's
territory. 147
Blackmun concluded his discussion of the U.N. Convention with a cri-
tique of the majority's reliance upon the negotiating history of a treaty,148
and in particular the oral statements of the representatives at a drafting
meeting.49 Blackmun stated that "a treaty's plain language must con-
trol absent 'extraordinarily strong contrary evidence.' "150 Blackmun
then insisted that there is no way to discern to what extent the comments
the majority relied upon were accepted by the Conference, nor precisely
what those comments actually meant. 5 ' Blackmun concluded by point-
ing out that even if the interpretation relied upon by the majority is cor-
rect-that a nation has the right to close its borders to a massive flow of
refugees-there is no indication that the drafters intended to permit a
145. Taking the definitions of "refouler" accepted by the majority, Blackmun stated: "Thus
construed, Article 33.1 of the Convention reads: 'No contracting state shall expel or [repulse, drive
back, or repel] a refugee in any manner whatsoever to the frontiers of territories where his life or
freedom would be threatened . ..' That, of course, is exactly what the Government is doing."
Haitian Centers Council, 1993 WL 211610, at *15 (Blackmun, J., dissenting) (brackets in original).
146. Id.
147. At this point, Blackmun showed his exasperation with the majority. "One wonders what
the majority would make of an exception that removed from the Article's protection all refugees who
.constitute a danger to their families.' By the majority's logic, the inclusion of such an exception
presumably would render Article 33.1 applicable only to refugees with families." Id.
148. "Reliance on a treaty's negotiating history (travaux preparatoires) is a disfavored alternative
of last resort, appropriate only where the terms of the document are obscure or lead to 'manifestly
absurd or unreasonable' results." Id. at *16 (citations omitted).
149. This general rule "has no application to oral statements made by those negotiating the
treaty which were not embodied in any writing and were not communicated to the government of
the negotiator or to its ratifying body." Id. (quoting Arizona v. California, 292 U.S. 341, 360
(1934)).
150. Id.
151. Id.
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contracting state to go forth and seize aliens who have not even reached
its borders and return them to persecution.15 2
The majority and dissent in Haitian Centers Council disagreed so fun-
damentally on each and every legal aspect of the refoulement issue that it
is hard to believe that both opinions were addressing the same problem.
Nevertheless, the result of the Supreme Court's decision in Haitian Cen-
ters Council is likely to have a far-reaching impact. The U.S. government
will rely upon the legal shield provided by the majority's opinion as it
confronts other situations with refugees on the high seas. 153 Other na-
tions are also likely to turn to the U.S. Supreme Court decision when
political exigencies make it desirable for them to do so. Right or wrong,
this new interpretation of the U.N. Convention's prohibition against
refoulement is likely to have a profound impact upon the field of refugee
law.
IV. TOWARD A UNIVERSAL DEFINITION AND WORKABLE PRACTICE
International practice is unquestionably disparate in determining when
the right against refoulement should be extended to individuals fleeing
their homeland. The recent decision of the United States Supreme Court
is likely to lend support to a modest interpretation of non-refoulement
obligations.154 In order to prevent protectionist, and ultimately short-
sighted policies from prevailing, a universal definition of the non-refoule-
ment obligation must be developed. Fundamentally, non-refoulement
should be extended to all refugees who have escaped their home coun-
try-law, morality, and practical politics all dictate a broad interpreta-
tion of this international obligation.
152. Id. at *17 (Blackmun, J., dissenting).
153. In the summer of 1993, the United States was confronted with yet another refugee crisis.
Three ships approached the United States carrying 659 Chinese people. Tim Golden, Mexico in
Switch Decides to Accept Stranded Chinese, N.Y. TIMS, July 15, 1993, at Al, A12. The United
States Coast Guard kept the ships outside of the United States' territorial limits, and re-routed the
ships to a position off the Mexican Coast. Id. Because Mexico is not a party to the U.N. Convention
or U.N. Protocol, Mexico planned to return the Chinese to China without screening. Id. The
United States, relying on the recent Supreme Court decision, deemed it was not obligated to provide
screening when it encountered the ships in international waters. Id. Apparently, the United States
has adopted a new "policy, intended to combat illegal immigration, [which] calls for the interception
and 'redirection' of boats smuggling aliens." Deborah Sontag, Despite Statements Mexico has De-
ported Illegal Aliens, N.Y. TIMEs, July 15, 1993, at A12.
154. See supra part III.
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A. Universal Definition
Some might question the wisdom of a consistent, universal definition
of the principle of non-refoulement. If a state wants to adhere to its own
set of rules in this field, some might argue, it should be able to do so.
Such a view is short-sighted and detrimental to the entire international
community. First, the treatment of refugees is an international problem
demanding an international response. Second, refugees rarely are in con-
trol of their ultimate destination, and it is unfair that the extent of the
non-refoulement protection is dependent on the refugees' proximity to a
state with a favorable interpretation. Third, by allowing flexible interpre-
tations, no minimum protection is assured, limiting the practical benefit
of the non-refoulement principle.
A history of the non-refoulement obligation is instructive. Following
World War II, the victorious powers realized that the problem of dis-
placed persons in Europe was not a problem that could be effectively
solved by individual nations.' 5 In the intervening years, this realization
has become even more profound when applied to the myriad refugee
problems that have developed throughout the world. The costs of sup-
porting refugees fleeing persecution, and the burden of finding new
homes for these people are simply too great to be borne by individual
nations. 56 This is particularly true when so many of the world's refugee
problems arise in the poorest regions, with refugees fleeing destitution in
one land only to arrive at a neighbor with no wealth of its own to
share.'57 A cohesive approach to refugee problems can only help to
make the world's assistance to refugees more effective and efficient.
Refugees are victims of circumstance. By definition, no one chooses to
be a refugee. As a result, the fact that a country 2000 miles away from a
refugee has a more beneficial policy towards non-refoulement than the
155. The Preamble of the U.N. Convention reaffirms this notion: "Considering that the grant of
asylum may place unduly heavy burdens on certain countries, and that a satisfactory solution of a
problem of which the United Nations has recognized the international scope and nature cannot
therefore be achieved without international cooperation .. " U.N. Convention, supra note 4, pmbl.
at 150.
156. In 1991, the UNHCR spent nearly $883 million on refugee assistance. This money was
spent on emergency assistance, care and maintenance, voluntary repatriation, local settlement, and
resettlement. 1992 Report of the UNHCR, supra note 1, at 47-52 (Tables 1 and 2).
157. Over a third of UNHCR expenditures in 1991 were in African states, which accounted for
less than 0.02% of total member contributions ($207,000 out of $745.6 million). The contributions
from African states accounted for less than 1% of expenditures on refugee assistance in Africa. 1992
REPORT OF THE UNHCR, supra note 1, at 47-56 (Tables 1 and 3). Without a cohesive international
system, African states could not deal effectively with the crises.
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asylum-seeker's nearest neighbor is of no practical benefit to the individ-
ual seeking immediate protection. The asylum-seeker must seek refuge
in the closest place, with few exceptions. Thus, without a universal defi-
nition, the ability of a potential refugee to gain protection from refoule-
ment depends as much on chance as on the will of nations. A minimum
standard defining the obligations of states toward asylum-seekers will en-
sure that regardless of the good or ill fortune of asylum-seekers, the pro-
tection they need will be there.
Without a minimal standard, the practical benefit of the principle of
non-refoulement is dubious. Nations will take the politically expedient
path of least resistance, and unfortunately, those faced with the greatest
refugee burdens will offer the least protection. 158
Thus, a universal definition would not only be beneficial-it is a practi-
cal necessity. Only by approaching the refugee situation globally can na-
tions find effective solutions, and provide true protection for the people
most in need.
B. Universal Application
Fortunately, there already exists a universal definition of the non-
refoulement principle that, although not adhered to consistently, sets the
appropriate standard for the behavior of nations: the non-refoulement ob-
ligation should apply to all states as soon as a refugee crosses any inter-
national boundary, which includes that of the refugee's country of origin.
Such a definition is legally correct, it is morally correct, and perhaps,
most importantly, it creates the best policy incentives from an interna-
tional perspective.
Non-refoulement in its broadest sense is firmly entrenched in the inter-
national legal system. The most fair reading of the U.N. Convention
indicates that nations are obligated to avoid refoulement whenever a refu-
gee is found.159 Other international legal principles also strengthen the
extraterritorial applicability of the non-refoulement obligation. 160
158. The situation in Africa today appears to contradict this statement. However, as noted
above, the refugee system in Africa is heavily dependent on the international community for support.
See supra note 157. It is doubtful that African states would be as hospitable as they are if it were not
for the tremendous financial assistance provided. Furthermore, the O.A.U. Convention firmly estab-
lished a high standard of respect for refugee rights from which African states have been loathe to
derogate. See supra notes 113-118 and accompanying text.
159. See supra notes 33-42 and accompanying text.
160. See infra notes 171-173 and accompanying text.
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Article 33 inescapably provides that non-refoulement applies to con-
tracting states extraterritorially. The Vienna Convention on the Law of
Treaties16 ' requires interpretation of language in treaties in accordance
with the ordinary meaning of the terms. 1 62 As noted above, the language
of Article 33 of the U.N. Convention is sufficiently unambiguous to not
require reference to anything other than the text itself.161 The require-
ment that no contracting state expel or return a refugee does not limit the
location of the refugee, as the Convention does in numerous other arti-
cles. In fact, the word "refugee" is repeatedly modified in the Conven-
tion by clauses limiting the scope of particular articles to refugees located
physically164 or legally' 65 within the territory of a contracting state.
Even clause 2 of Article 33, which is the national security and prior seri-
ous crime limitation on the non-refoulement principle, applies only to
refugees who constitute a danger to the country in which they are
found.1 66 The lack of restrictive, limiting language following the word
"refugee" in clause 1 of Article 33 strongly supports an interpretation
extending protection to refugees wherever they may be found.167
Furthermore, the term "refugee" is defined geographically in Article 1
of the Convention (and Article 1 of the Protocol). A "refugee" is defined
as someone who is "outside the country of his nationality" '168 without
regard to exactly where outside his country of nationality. Thus, once
the international boundary is crossed, an individual fleeing persecution
attains refugee status and acquires all the concomitant rights of a refugee,
161. Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, supra note 38.
162. "A treaty shall be interpreted in good faith in accordance with the ordinary meaning to be
given to the terms of the treaty in their context and in the light of its object and purpose." Vienna
Convention on the Law of Treaties, supra note 38, art. 31, at 691-92.
163. See supra notes 33-42 and accompanying text.
164. See, eg., U.N. Convention, supra note 4, art. 2, art. 4, art. 14, art. 25, art. 27, art. 30, art.
31, and art. 33(2).
165. See, eg., U.N. Convention, supra note 4, art. 15, art. 17, art. 18, art. 19, art. 21, art. 23, art.
24, art. 26, art. 28, and art. 32.
166. "The benefit of the present provision may not, however, be claimed by a refugee who
presents a danger to the security of the country in which he is, or who, having been convicted by a
final judgment of a particularly serious crime, constitutes a danger to the community of that coun-
try." U.N. Convention, supra note 4, art. 33(2), at 176 (emphasis added).
This, of course, is the section relied on by the majority of the United States Supreme Court to
show that non-refoulement does not apply outside the territory of a contracting state. See supra part
III.
167. See Brief for Respondents, at n.31-37, Sale v. Haitian Centers Council, No. 92-344, 1993
WL 211610 (U.S. June 21, 1993).
168. U.N. Convention, supra note 4, art. l(A)(2), at 152.
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including the right against refoulement.'69
Finally, reliance on the negotiating history, which is inconclusive at
best, 170 is inappropriate. When the plain language of a treaty is clear, no
purpose is served by attempting to discern "legislative" intent. 17t
The extraterritorial application of the non-refoulement obligation finds
legal support in other contexts as well. The Universal Declaration of
Human Rights, 172 for example, assures everyone the right to seek asylum
and the right to leave their country. 171 If the principle of non-refoule-
ment does not obligate nations once an asylum-seeker has crossed the
outer boundary of the nation he or she is fleeing, then the right to seek
asylum and the right to leave one's country, as guaranteed by the Univer-
sal Declaration of Human Rights, are empty promises. 174
Not only is an extraterritorial interpretation legally correct, it is mor-
ally correct. At its core, non-refoulement is a humanitarian concept.
Though nations are somewhat hesitant to relinquish control over their
169. Other refugee rights include the right against deportation, the right against unjustified de-
tention, the right to seek a gainful occupation, and the right to pursue education. 1988 Report ofthe
UNHCR, supra note 5, at 6-7.
170. See supra notes 43-46 and accompanying text.
171. The Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties allows reference to preparatory work only
when the meaning is "ambiguous or obscure" or if the result from such interpretation would be
"manifestly absurd or unreasonable". Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, supra note 38,
art. 32, 8 I.L.M. 679, 692.
In the United States, this is a major canon of statutory interpretation:
[I]n interpreting a statute a court should always turn first to one, cardinal canon before all
others. We have stated time and again that courts must presume that a legislature says in a
statute what it means and means in a statute what it says there.... When the words of a
statute are unambiguous, then, this first canon is also the last: "Judicial inquiry is
complete."
Connecticut National Bank v. Germain, - U.S. -, 112 S.Ct. 1146, 1149 (1992) (citations omitted).
Similar principles are extended to interpretation of treaties. U.S. v. Stuart, 489 U.S. 353, 361-62,
365-66 (1989). See also Haitian Centers Council, 1993 WL 211610, at *16 (Blackmun, J.,
dissenting).
172. The Universal Declaration of Human Rights, G.A. Res. 217 (III(A)) U.N. GAOR, 3rd
Sess., 183d Plen. Mtg. (1948).
173. Id. art 14 (for the right to seek asylum). See also id. art 13 (for the right "to leave any
country, including [one's] own").
174. It should be noted that there has been no general agreement concerning the right to asylum
itself, beyond the right to seek asylum. There have been attempts to secure such a right in a Draft
Convention on Territorial Asylum. See Draft Convention on Territorial.Asylum, U.N. GAOR Con-
ference on Territorial Asylum, 30th Sess., U.N. Doc. A/Conf.78/12 (1977). Sadly, this convention
has not garnered enough support to be opened for signature, in what has been called "the only
failure of its kind in the history of law-making in the United Nations." Gervase Coles, Approaching
the Refugee Problem Today, in REFUGEES AND INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS 373, 383 (Gil Loe-
scher and Laila Monahan eds., 1989).
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sovereign power of regulating admission to their territories, the after-
math of World War II illustrated the importance of providing some pro-
tection for those in flight.17 5 Non-refoulement is thus not a threat to
territorial sovereignty.176 Rather, non-refoulement is largely a protective
device for refugees who lack the protection of fundamental rights from
their origin country because they have fled from that country.17 7
In addition to being legally and morally correct, an extraterritorial in-
terpretation of the non-refoulement obligation creates the best policy in-
centives for dealing with refugee situations. By placing a burden on
states capable of providing refuge, the non-refoulement principle forces
disinterested states to recognize the deplorable circumstances in other
states. It has often been said that there are three solutions to a refugee
problem: (1) returning the refugees to their home country; (2) granting
permanent asylum in the country of first refuge; and (3) finding a third
country to grant permanent asylum.17 This syllogism is clearly correct
once a refugee crisis exists. Yet there is a fourth option, a preventive
measure, which ideally should be tried first. Nations will only work to
avert the types of situations that cause refugee crises if doing so is in their
best interest. A legal environment that places responsibilities on those
nations from the outset provides incentives for those nations to work
harder to avert such situations. 179
175. The tragedy of the St. Louis is well known to be a leading source of the development of the
moral resolve against refoulement among Western states. In 1939, over 900 Jews boarded a ship, the
St. Louis, "in an effort to flee Nazi Germany. But port after port refused to allow them to enter and
they were eventually forced to return to Germany, where almost all eventually perished in German
concentration camps." Patricia Camp, Jewish Union Plans National Drive To Resettle Indochinese
Refugees, WASH. POST, Sept. 8, 1979, at B3. For a full account of this frightening abandonment of
people in need see GORDON THOMAS AND MAX MORGAN WITTs, VOYAGE OF THE DAMNED
(1974).
176. At most, non-refoulement creates an obligation for temporary refuge. There is technically
no requirement that any state admit anyone into their territory, even someone who qualifies as a
refugee under the U.N. Convention definition. Such individuals are protected from return to the
hands of their persecutors, but they are not protected from being delivered anywhere else. Some
commentators have argued that a customary norm of providing temporary refuge has emerged. See
Deborah Perluss and Joan F. Hartman, Temporary Refuge: Emergence of a Customary Norm, 26
VA. J. INT'L L. 551. Even so, temporary refuge is not a challenge to state sovereignty.
177. See supra notes 47 and 49.
178. See, e.g., Perluss and Hartman, supra note 176, at 554; Gil Loescher, Introduction: Refugee
Issues in International Relations, in REFUGEES AND INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS 1, 27 (Gil Loe-
scher and Laila Monahan eds., 1989).
179. This might, in fact, be an excellent place for an application of the Coase Theorem. There
are very clearly high transaction costs associated with averting massive refugee flows. If the obliga-
tion to attempt to avoid such crises is placed on the country of origin, which in all likelihood is
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C. Practical Considerations
International law is largely the law of consent. As noted above, even
with the strict legal obligation of non-refoulement in place, many states
have derogated from their duty.180 Perhaps the only way to ensure that
the obligation of non-refoulement is respected extraterritorially is to draft
a protocol to the U.N. Convention clearly delineating such an interpreta-
tion. As the refugees of the world continue to suffer, nations simply must
not turn their backs on a legal obligation that is also morally correct and
that creates policy incentives for the world to deal responsibly with
problems that confront it. The Appendix, which follows, is a draft proto-
col which would accomplish just this result. This draft protocol commits
signatory states to the principle of non-refoulement regardless where a
refugee may be found so long as he or she is outside the country of his or
her nationality and unable to avail himself or herself of the protection of
that country. The draft protocol further clarifies the obligation of non-
refoulement by extending the prohibition against expulsion or return to
refugees in international waters. Humanity compels continued adherence
to a higher moral ground, it is hopeful that states in the new world order
will be able to hold themselves legally responsible to the helpless in the
world.
CONCLUSION
As the U.N. Convention stands today non-refoulement requires inter-
national protection of asylum-seekers once they escape the frontiers of
the country they are fleeing. Yet states are inconsistent in adhering to
this obligation. A new Protocol to the U.N. Convention, clearly de-
lineating the extraterritorial reach of the non-refoulement obligation, is
economically troubled, then there is essentially no potential for the country of origin to pay others to
take on the obligation. Yet if the obligation were shifted, by changing the international legal order,
other countries may be willing to pay countries of origin to assume the obligation of avoiding refu-
gee-creating problems. The payment itself would likely be great enough to rectify circumstances to
avert massive refugee flows. This is, in fact, probably why nations have bound themselves to the
principle of non-refoulement.
Coase, however, has complained about extending his observations about the impact of transaction
costs on economic theory to other fields. R.H. COASE, THE FIRM, THE MARKET AND THE LAW 15
(1988). Nevertheless, his fundamental observation has considerable applicability in many fields.
Coase did not argue that the assignment of legal rights does not matter because parties will bargain
to find an efficient outcome. Rather, Coase argued that such a proposition can only be true in a
world without transaction costs. The existence of transaction costs can make the initial assignment
of rights determinative of the outcome. See id. at 10-16.
180. See supra part II.
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perhaps the only way to establish consistent protection for refugees that
comports with morality and practical politics. At a minimum nations
must be obligated to provide screening to determine whether an asylum-
seeker is a true refugee, and if so, to provide all the concomitant rights to
which refugees are entitled, including the right of non-refoulement. Only
strict adherence to this principle can lead to a moral, efficient, and fair
system of refugee protection.
Robert L. Newmark
Washington University Open Scholarship
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APPENDIX
A DRAFT PROTOCOL RELATING TO THE STATUS OF
REFUGEES1
8 1
The States Parties to the Present Protocol,
Considering the inconsistent application of obligations arising out of
the convention relating to the Status of Refugees done at Geneva on 28
July 1951 [hereinafter referred to as the "Convention"] and the Protocol
relating to the Status of Refugees done at New York on 31 January 1967
[hereinafter referred to as the "Protocol I"], particularly obligations aris-
ing out of Article 33 of the Convention,
Noting with great dismay the disparity of treatment afforded refugees
depending upon the interpretation of obligations undertaken by signatory
states,
Believing that it is desirable that equal treatment should be enjoyed by
all refugees covered by the definitions in the Convention and in the Pro-
tocol I irrespective of the signatory state they encounter,
Have agreed as follows:
ARTICLE I
GENERAL PROVISIONS
1. The States Parties to the present Protocol undertake to apply Arti-
cle 33 of the Convention as hereinafter clarified.
2. The prohibition against expulsion or return ("refouler") of a refu-
gee to the frontiers of territories where his or her life or freedom would
be threatened applies to States Parties to the present Protocol regardless
where such a refugee may be found so long as, in accordance with Article
1 of the Convention and Article 1 of the Protocol I, he or she is outside
the country of his or her nationality and is unable or unwilling to avail
himself or herself of the protection of that country.
3. Without limiting the obligation of Article 33 of the Convention,
the prohibition against expulsion or return ("refouler") expressly applies
to refugees in international waters, and to refugees who have arrived at
181. The format of this Draft Protocol follows closely the format of The 1967 U.N. Protocol,
supra note 4. The language in Articles II-XI, regarding implementation, mirrors the language in the
relevant articles from the 1951 U.N. Convention, supra note 4, and the 1967 U.N. Protocol, supra
note 4.
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the border of a State Party to the present Protocol regardless whether
such arrival be deemed lawful.
4. Nothing in the present Protocol shall be deemed to prevent a State
Party to the present Protocol from applying an exception to the prohibi-
tion of expulsion or return ("refouler") as provided for in Article 33(2) of
the Convention.
5. The existence of the present Protocol in no way implies that States
party to the Convention or the Protocol I are not obligated to the stan-
dards set forth in the present Protocol. The present Protocol is not a
change of the obligation of contracting states; it is merely a clarification
of already existing obligations.
ARTICLE II
CO-OPERATION OF THE NATIONAL AUTHORITIES
WITH THE UNITED NATIONS
1. The States Parties to the present Protocol undertake to co-operate
with the Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees,
or any other agency of the United Nations which may succeed it, in the
exercise of its functions, and shall in particular facilitate its duty of su-
pervising the application of the provisions of the present Protocol.
2. In order to enable the Office of the High Commissioner, or any
other agency of the United Nations which may succeed it, to make re-
ports to the competent organs of the United Nations, the States Parties to
the present Protocol undertake to provide them with the information and
statistical data requested, in the appropriate form, concerning:
a. The implementation of the present Protocol;
b. The screening of refugees;
c. Laws, regulations and decrees which are, or may hereafter be, in force
relating to refugees and the non-refoulement obligation.
ARTICLE III
INFORMATION ON NATIONAL LEGISLATION
The States Parties to the Present Protocol shall communicate to the
Secretary-General of the United Nations the laws and regulations which
they may adopt to ensure the application of the present Protocol.
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ARTICLE IV
SETTLEMENT OF DISPUTES
Any dispute between States Parties to the present Protocol which re-
lates to its interpretation or application and which cannot be settled by
other means shall be referred to the International Court of Justice at the
request of any one of the parties to the dispute.
ARTICLE V
ACCESSION
The present Protocol shall be open for accession on behalf of all the
States Parties to the Convention or the Protocol I and of any other State
Member of the United Nations or member of any of the specialized agen-
cies or to which an invitation to accede may have been addressed by the
General Assembly of the United Nations. Accession shall be effected by
the deposit of an instrument of accession with the Secretary-General of
the United Nations.
ARTICLE VI
FEDERAL CLAUSE
In the case of a Federal or non-unitary State, the following provisions
shall apply:
(a) With respect to those articles of the Convention and the Protocol I
to be applied in accordance with Article I of the present Protocol that
come within the legislative jurisdiction of the federal legislative author-
ity, the obligations of the Federal Government shall to this extent be the
same as those of States Parties which are not Federal States;
(b) With respect to those articles of the Convention and the Protocol I
to be applied in accordance with article I of the present Protocol that
come within the legislative jurisdiction of constituent States, provinces or
cantons which are not, under the constitutional system of the federation,
bound to take legislative action, the Federal Government shall bring
such articles with a favourable recommendation to the notice of the ap-
propriate authorities of States, provinces or cantons at the earliest possi-
ble moment;
(c) A Federal State Party to the present Protocol shall, at the request
of any other State Party hereto transmitted through the Secretary-Gen-
eral of the United Nations, supply a statement of the law and practice of
the Federation and its constituent units in regard to any particular provi-
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sion of the Convention or the Protocol I to be applied in accordance with
article I of the present Protocol, showing the extent to which effect has
been given to that provision by legislative or other action.
ARTICLE VII
RESERVATIONS AND DECLARATIONS
1. At the time of accession, any State may make reservations in re-
spect of article IV of the present Protocol.
2. Any State making a reservation in accordance with paragraph I of
this article may at any time withdraw such reservation by a communica-
tion to that effect addressed to the Secretary-General of the United
Nations.
3. Reservations made by States Parties to the Convention in accord-
ance with article 42 thereof shall, unless withdrawn, be applicable in rela-
tion to their obligations under the present Protocol.
4. Declaration made under article 40, paragraphs I and 2, of the
Convention by a State Party thereto which accedes to the present Proto-
col shall be deemed to apply in respect to the present Protocol, unless
upon accession a notification to the contrary is addressed by the State
Party concerned to the Secretary-General of the United Nations. The
provisions of article 40, paragraphs 2 and 3, and of article 44, paragraph
3, of the Convention shall be deemed to apply mutatis mutandis to the
present Protocol.
5. Reservations made by States Parties to the Protocol I in accord-
ance with article VII thereof shall, unless withdrawn, be applicable in
relation to the obligations under the present Protocol.
ARTICLE VIII
ENTRY INTO FORCE
1. The present Protocol shall come into force on the day of deposit of
the sixth instrument of accession.
2. For each State acceding to the Protocol after the deposit of the
sixth instrument of accession, the Protocol shall come into force on the
date of deposit by such State of its instrument of accession.
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ARTICLE IX
DENUNCIATION
1. Any State Party hereto may denounce this Protocol at anytime by
a notification addressed to the Secretary-General of the United Nations.
2. Such denunciation shall take effect for the State Party concerned
one year from the date on which it is received by the Secretary-General
of the United Nations.
ARTICLE X
NOTIFICATIONS BY THE SECRETARY-GENERAL
OF THE UNITED NATIONS
The Secretary-General of the United Nations shall inform the States
referred to in article V above of the date of entry into force, accessions,
reservations and withdrawals of reservations to and denuncications of the
present Protocol, and of declarations and notifications relating hereto.
ARTICLE XI
DEPOSIT IN THE ARCHIVES OF THE SECRETARIAT
OF THE UNITED NATIONS
A copy of the present Protocol, of which the Chinese, English, French,
Russian and Spanish texts are equally authentic, signed by the President
of the General Assembly and by the Secretary-General of the United Na-
tions, shall be deposited in the archives of the Secretariat of the United
Nations. The Secretary-General will transmit certified copies thereof to
all States Members of the United Nations and to the other States referred
to in article V above.
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